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2025 Vol.34, Issue 4 Preview Page

Research Paper

Revisiting the Role of Auctioned Allowances: Understanding Their Neutrality in ETS Market Pricing

배출권거래제 내 유상할당의 본질과 시장가격과의 비연계성 규명

유종민*‧이서진**

Jongmin Yu* and Seojin Lee**

*홍익대학교 경제학부 부교수, 제1저자(e-mail: yucono@hongik.ac.kr)
**홍익대학교 경제학부 부교수, 교신저자(e-mail: sjlee@hongik.ac.kr)
*Associate Professor, Department of Economics, Hongik University, First author (e-mail: yucono@hongik.ac.kr)
**Associate Professor, Department of Economics, Hongik University, Corresponding author (e-mail: sjlee@hongik.ac.kr)
31 December 2025. pp. 513-540
PDF Citation
Abstract
This study theoretically analyzes the impact of allowance auctioning within an Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) on achieving greenhouse gas reduction targets and provides relevant policy implications. While an ETS is generally regarded as a quantity-based policy instrument in which the total emissions cap is set independently of the allocation method, many policymakers and market participants perceive auctioning as a mechanism that can further stimulate emissions reductions. To evaluate this claim, we develop a theoretical model that systematically examines how variations in the proportion of auctioned allowances affect market equilibrium and firms’abatement incentives. The analysis shows that auctioning may lead to emission reductions in certain sectors by increasing the opportunity cost of emitting, but simultaneously weaken abatement incentives in other sectors through lower allowance prices—thereby rendering the overall emissions reduction effect neutral. Consequently, allowance auctioning should be understood less as an independent instrument for achieving additional abatement, and more as a redistributive policy mechanism among sectors or between private entities and the government. The findings highlight the need for a more cautious and purpose-driven approach to the design of allocation policies within ETS frameworks.
Keywords
Greenhouse gas reduction policy
Emission trading scheme
Paid allocation
Grandfathering
Abatement effectiveness
본 논문은 배출권거래제(ETS: Emission Trading Scheme)에서의 유상할당 방식이 온실가스 감축 목표에 미치는 영향을 이론적으로 분석하고 정책적 함의를 제시한다. 일반적으로 ETS는 총 배출량(cap)이 할당방식과 독립적으로 설정되는 수량기반 정책(quantity-based policy)으로 간주되지만, 많은 정책입안자와 시장 이해관계자들은 유상할당 방식이 온실가스 감축을 추가적으로 촉진할 수 있다고 인식하고 있다. 본 연구는 이러한 주장을 면밀히 검토하기 위해 유상할당 비율 변화가 배출권 시장의 균형과 개별 기업의 감축 유인에 미치는 영향을 이론모형을 통해 체계적으로 분석하였다. 분석 결과, 유상할당 방식은 특정 부문에서 배출권에 대한 기회비용 증가로 온실가스 배출량을 감소시킬 수 있으나, 배출권 가격 하락을 통해 다른 부문의 감축 인센티브를 약화시킬 가능성이 있어 전체 배출량 감소 효과와 무관할 수 있음을 확인하였다. 따라서 유상할당은 온실가스 감축 효과를 위한 독립적인 수단이라기보다는 부문 간 또는 기업과 정부 간의 경제적 재분배를 위한 정책적 수단으로 보다 명확히 인식될 필요가 있다. 본 연구의 결과는 ETS의 할당정책을 설계할 때 보다 신중한 접근과 명확한 정책 목적 설정이 중요함을 시사한다.
키워드
온실가스 감축정책
배출권거래제
유상할당
무상할당
저감효과
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Information
  • Publisher :Environmental and Resource Economics Review
  • Publisher(Ko) :자원 · 환경경제연구
  • Journal Title :자원·환경경제연구
  • Journal Title(Ko) :Environmental and Resource Economics Review
  • Volume : 34
  • No :4
  • Pages :513-540
  • DOI :https://doi.org/10.15266/KEREA.2025.34.4.513
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